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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 20020330-CA

1A IN<'K PETERSON,
Defendant/Appellee.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
• * *

ARGUMENT
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State submits this reply
to points 1 and II of defendant's brief which i aisenew matters on appeal. Because I he State's
opening brief fully addresses the argument in point III of defendant's brief, no reply to point
III is necessary.
I. THE STATE TIMELY APPEALED THE DISMISSAL OF COUNT 2
In point I of his brief, defendant contends that the State's appeal from the dismissal of
count 2 was not timely. Aple. Brf. at 3-5. According to defendant, the time forfilingthe
notice of appeal began to runfromthe date of the preliminary hearing when the magistrate
found the evidence insufficient to support a bindover on count 2 and orally granted the
motion to dismiss count 2. Aple. Brf. at 3-5. Defendant's contention lacks merit.
The law is well settled that the verbal pronouncements of the court are not appealable.
Even "[a]n unsigned minute entry does not c: onstiti ite afinalordei foi purposes of appeal."

State v. Crowley, 111 P.2d 198,198 (Utah 1987). The oral statement of the court announcing
a judgment or order is not appealable "until it has been reduced to writing and signed by the
court." State v. Wright, 904 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Utah App. 1995) (referencing sentencing).
This requirement holds true not only for final judgments, but also for interlocutory orders.
See, e.g., State v. Russell, 2002 UT 14 (per curiam) (holding that the Court does not have
jurisdiction to consider appealfroma bindover order because defendant had not provided a
copy of a signed order) (unpublished decision, Addendum A).
Defendant cites State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1994), in support of the
proposition that the court's verbal dismissal of Count 2 constituted afinalorder. Aple. Brf.
at 4-5. Defendant's reliance on Jaeger is misplaced Jaeger in fact holds that a magistrate's
dismissal of an Information constitutes afinalorder for purposes of appeal. Jaeger, 886 P.2d
at 55. However, unlike the case here, the dismissal in Jaeger was in the form of a written
order, not a verbal pronouncement See Jaeger, 886 P.2d at 53-54 (noting that the magistrate
"issued a seventeen-page memorandum decision" dismissing the information for lack of
probable cause). Jaeger, therefore, is inapposite.
In this case, there was no signed order until after the trial court granted defendant's
motion to suppress. After receiving evidence at the preliminary hearing, the trial court
concluded:
. . . I'd move to dismiss [ ] count [2] in regards to the possession [or] use of
methamphetamine. There's been no evidence introduced to the Court that
there's... of that object. It's not been introduced. There's no lab reports that
have been introduced to identify it. All we have is a presumptive test of the
officer about the substance, and there's nothing been offered to this Court in
2

evidence. The officer's opinion is not sufficient enough to meet the burden of
proof as far as the object itself.
R. 121: 39. The prosecutor countered that the State had met its burden, arguing that a
positive field test from an experienced and trained officer was sufficient. R. 121:39-40. Not

1211 40, The court's verbal pronouncement, however, was not reduced to writing. The
minute entry of the preliminary hearing reflects a finding of probable cause on counts 1 and
3 bill us iinsiKin ill IN1 I "' 1 he minute rnfr ul flic |ilcn hearing indicates that coum .. -as
dismissed, but again is unsigned. R. 24. Only after the trial court granted defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence seized in connection with counts 1 and 3 was a signed order
entered '.lisnussiny "'fif charges as set forth on the Information

\ee R, .S-ft, 1 12.l

Defendant contends that the Order of Dismissal applied only to counts 1 and 3. The
Order did in fact memorialize the court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence relating to counts 1 and 3. See R. 11 I However, the Order of Dismissal also stated
that "the charges as setforth on the Information in this case are hereby dismissed." R 112
(emphasis added). The order was not, therefore, confined to counts 1 and 3, but dismissed

1

Defendant argues that u[b]oth parties were aware that the only remaining
offenses before the Court were the offenses set forth in Counts 1&3." Aple. Brf. at 4.
Certainly, both parties understood that the magistrate had granted the motion to dismiss.
However, the State has always maintained that an order of dismissal was necessary. See
R. 97-98.
3

without restriction "the charges as set forth on the Information," which included count 2. R.
112.2
Because the Order dismissed all the charges in the Information, it constituted "a final
judgment of dismissal," rather than an interlocutory order. See Utah Code Ann. § 77- 18al(2)(a) (providing that "a dismissal of a felony information following a refusal to bind the
defendant over for trial" is a final judgment of dismissal); see also Jaeger, 886 P.2d at 55.
Accordingly, the State had 30 days within which to file a notice of appeal. See Utah R. App.
P. 3(a); 4(a). The Order of Dismissal was entered on April 1, 2002 and the State filed its
notice of appeal on April 22,2002. See R. 112,114. Therefore, the State's appeal is timely.
II. THE STATE'S APPEAL IS NOT MOOT
In point II of his brief, defendant argues that the State's appeal is moot because the
trial court granted his motion to suppress the evidence. This claim also lacks merit
As explained in the State's opening brief, Aplt. Brf. at 3, counts 1 and 3 were based on
evidence seizedfromdefendant's vehicle at the Lindon Boat Harbor on the night of October
18, 2000. R. 5-6; R. 121: 7, 12-15. Count 2, on the other hand, was based on evidence

2

If, as defendant suggests, count 2 was not dismissed by the order, this Court is
without jurisdiction and the appeal should be dismissed without prejudice pending entry
of a signed order. Cf. State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, f 14,51 P.3d 55 (dismissing
defendant's appeal without prejudice subject to entry of a judgment of conviction).

4

seizedfromdefendant's residence later that night pursuant to defendant's consent. R. 6; R.
121:34-36. After the magistrate bound defendant over for trial on counts 1 and 3, defendant
moved to suppress only the evidence seized from his person and vehicle on October 18,
2000. R. 26-28 (Addendum B). He did not move to suppress the evidence seizedfromhis
bedroom later that night, see R. 26-28, and the State did not therefore address that issue in its
memorandum opposing the motion to suppress, see R. 33-36. Thus, contrary to his claim in
point II of his brief, defendant did not move to suppress all the evidence "obtained by the
police in connection with his arrest and detention/' but only that evidence seized in
connection with the search of his person and vehicle at the boat harbor. Aple. Brf. at 5.
Given the magistrate's refusal to bind defendant over for trial on count 2, defendant's
failure to move for the suppression of the evidence seizedfromhis bedroom is not surprising.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that defendant did not move for the suppression of the
methamphetamine. Because the court's grant of defendant's motion only resulted in the
suppression of evidence seizedfromhis vehicle, it does not render moot the State's claim
that the magistrate improperly dismissed count 2, which was based on the methamphetamine
seizedfromdefendant's bedroom.
Admittedly, a finding that the search of the vehicle was illegal might render the
subsequent consent search invalid. As observed by the Utah Supreme Court, "a defendant's
consent to a search following illegal police activity is [nevertheless] valid under the Fourth
Amendment... if both of the following tests are met: "(i) The consent was given voluntarily,
and (ii) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." State v.
5

Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1262 (Utah 1993). Therefore, even assuming that the search of the
vehicle was illegal, it does not necessarily follow that the subsequent consent search was also
unlawful.3 However, the issue of consent was not brought before the trial court. It was
neither raised by defendant in his motion to suppress, nor was it addressed in the State's
memorandum opposing the motion. This Court will not therefore address it for the first time
onappeal. See State v. Archambeau, S2QP2d9209922(\JtahApp. 1991). This is especially
true where, as here, the factual circumstances surrounding the consent were not explored at
the evidentiary hearing. See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,887 (Utah App. 1990).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons and those stated in the opening brief, the State respectfully requests
the Court to reverse the order of dismissal and remand this case for further proceedings-

It is important to note that the trial court granted the motion to suppress not on
the merits, but because 'the State [was] not ready to proceed" R. 124: 9. As a result,
should this Court reverse the dismissal of count 2 and defendant thereafter move to
suppress the evidence seizedfromthe bedroom, the trial court may consider on the merits
the legality of the search of the vehicle in determining the validity of the consent search
of the bedroom. Cf. Utah R. Crim. P. 25 (providing that court may dismiss information
for unreasonable delay in bringing defendant to trial, but such dismissal does not bar
further prosecution of offense).

6

Respectfully submitted this /O day of January, 2003
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

S.GRAY
5SISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

Addendum A

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—00O00—

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Ouray Russell,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20010791-CA
FILED
January 17, 2002
|| 2002UTApp14

[I

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Ann Boyden
Attorneys:
Victor Marshall Gordon, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark Shurtleff and Brett J. DeiPorto, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Thome.
PER CURIAM:
This case is before the court on what appears to be an appeal from an order binding Appellant over to stand trial
on criminal charges. Appellant has not provided a copy of the order from which he appeals. Appellant has also
failed to file a docketing statement and has not responded to this courts sua sponte notice of consideration for
summary disposition. Appellee did file a response to the notice.
Because Appellant does not appeal from a signed, final appealable order, this court does not have jurisdiction to
hear this appeal. Se$ Utah R. App. P. 3(a). Moreover, Appellant has not sought permission to appeal an
interlocutory order pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, the appeal is
dismissed based on lack of jurisdiction without
prejudice to filing an appeal upon obtaining a final order or judgment.

Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge

James Z. Davis, Judge

William A. Thome, Jr., Judge

Addendum B

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Defendant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box L
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
Telephone: (801) 373-4912
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Plaintiff,
vs.

: Case No.001404056

LANCE PETERSON,
Division 2
Defendant.
COMES NOW the defendant and hereby moves to suppress the evidence
obtained during a s§ai£^^f|ui.person and which occurred on October 18,2001,
upon the grounds that the search was conducted in violation of his right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure under the provisions of the Fourth
1

Amendment and Article I Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
Specifically, defendant asserts the following grounds for suppressing evidence.
1. That the search was conducted without a search warrant.
2. That the law enforcement officers had no probable cause to search the
person of the defendant or the vehicle of the defendant.
3. That the search of defendant's person and vehicle was without consent.
4. That the search of the defendant's person and vehicle was not pursuant to
arrest.
5. That the search exceeded the scope of the officer's authority under U.C.A.
§ 77-7-16.
6. That the defendant was unconstitutionally detained.
7. That the detention and search of the defendant's person and vehicle was in
violation of the constitutional provisions set forth above and the following case law:
State v. LopezLm?.2dJL 127jTJtah 1994); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State
v. Roybal, 1X1 P.2d 291(Utah 1986); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); and Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S.
2

366 (1993).
The search in this matter being a warrantless search, the burden is upon the
state to justify the search. Defendant requests this matter be set for hearing on
defendant's morion.
Dated this 18* day of January, 20001.

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing motion to the
following:
KAYBRYSON
Utah County Attorney
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606

ll5kday of January, 2001
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